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We explore the macro/finance interface in the context of equity markets. In particular, using 
half a century of Livingston expected business conditions data we characterize directly the 
impact of expected business conditions on expected excess stock returns. Expected business 
conditions consistently affect expected excess returns in a statistically and economically 
significant counter-cyclical fashion: depressed expected business conditions are associated 
with high expected excess returns. Moreover, inclusion of expected business conditions in 
otherwise standard predictive return regressions substantially reduces the explanatory power 
of the conventional financial predictors, including the dividend yield, default premium, and 
term premium, while simultaneously increasing R
2. Expected business conditions retain 
predictive power even after controlling for an important and recently introduced non-financial 
predictor, the generalized consumption/wealth ratio, which accords with the view that 
expected business conditions play a role in asset pricing different from and complementary to 
that of the consumption/wealth ratio. We argue that time-varying expected business 
conditions likely capture time-varying risk, while time-varying consumption/wealth may 
capture time-varying risk aversion. 
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 “... [if] cyclical variation in the market risk premium is present, ...we would expect to
find evidence of it from forecasting regressions of excess returns on macroeconomic
variables over business cycle horizons.  Yet the most widely investigated predictive
variables have not been macroeconomic variables, but financial indicators.”
(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2005)
1.  Introduction
The equity market macro-finance interface presents a clear puzzle:  Many have argued
that business conditions should be linked to expected excess returns (e.g., Fama and French,
1989, 1990; Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; Barro, 1990 ), yet the standard predictors are not
macroeconomic, but rather financial:  dividend yields, default premia, and term premia.  Several
authors have claimed that the standard financial predictors may serve as proxies for expected
business conditions, and they interpret their predictive power through that lens.
1  In the absence
of direct expectations data, however, the claim that expected excess equity returns are driven by
expected business conditions remains largely speculative.
Against this background, we use a well-known survey to provide direct evidence on the
links between expected business conditions and expected excess equity returns over some fifty
years.  We ask two key sets of questions.  First, are the standard financial predictors related to
expected business conditions, and if so, how?
Second, do expected business conditions indeed forecast future returns?  Are expected
business conditions a useful predictor of excess returns even after controlling for the standard
financial predictors?  And conversely, are the standard financial predictors useful even after
controlling for expected business conditions?   If not, do any standard financial predictors retain
power after conditioning on expected business conditions?-2-
We proceed as follows.  In section 2 we describe the data, and in particular our survey-
based measure of expected business conditions.  In section 3 we examine the links between
expected business conditions and the standard financial predictors of excess returns.  In section 4
we document the effects of including expected business conditions in otherwise-standard return
predictive regressions, at both short and long horizons, and we also examine a recently-
introduced predictor, the consumption/wealth ratio, which turns out to be very important.  We
conclude in section 5.
2.  Data
Here we introduce the data on which our analysis is based, with special attention paid to
the Livingston survey, and we briefly document some of their properties.
Excess Returns and Financial Predictors
We construct excess stock returns using the CRSP value-weighted portfolio and the 90-
day U.S. Treasury bill rate, 1952:1-2003:2.  We examine several standard and widely-studied
financial return predictors, the dividend yield (DP, calculated for the CRSP value-weighted
portfolio), the default premium (DEF, calculated as the yield difference between a broad
corporate bond portfolio and the Aaa yield) and the term premium (TERM, calculated as the
yield difference between a ten-year Treasury bond and a one-month Treasury bill), also 1952:1-
2003:2.  In Table 1, we present summary statistics for excess returns and all predictors.
The Livingston Forecasts
Our business conditions expectations data come from the Livingston Survey of
Professional Forecasters.  The Livingston survey is widely followed, heavily studied, and2 For a fine overview of the history and use of the Livingston survey, see Croushore
(1997). 
3 It would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper, to attempt to replicate its
results using expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
4 Note the timing convention associated with our use of semi-annual data:  2001:2, for
example, refers to the second half of 2001, i.e., 7/1/2001 through 12/31/2001.
5 Unfortunately, the Livingston survey does not ask participants about expectations of
current GDP of CPI levels, so we can not use it to construct one-step-ahead forecasts (a step
being a six-month interval).
6 Presumably one could also make some use of the distribution of forecasts, but we have
not yet explored that avenue.  See Miller (1977) and Guo and Savickas (2005).
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generally respected.
2  Moreover, and importantly, it is available over a long sample period, in
contrast for example to the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which begins only in 1968.
3  The
Livingston survey is semi-annual, conducted in June and December.  Our sample begins in
1952:1, which matches the beginning of the continuously-recorded Livingston survey data, and
continues until 2003:2.
4 
We construct real GDP growth expectations from the nominal GDP and CPI level
expectations reported in the Livingston survey, which solicits respondents’ views regarding
economic variables in six and twelve months’ time.
5  We aggregate the Livingston responses into
median forecasts, obtaining, for each series and survey date, a median forecast of the series’
level six and twelve months hence, and we take log differences to obtain an approximate two-
step-ahead growth rate forecast, as in Gultekin (1983).
6  The final result is a series of two-step-
ahead real GDP growth forecasts,  .
The two-step-ahead real growth rate forecasts constructed from the Livingston data
appear well-behaved.  In Figure 1 we show the actual growth rates, the Livingston forecasts, and7 See Diebold (2004).
8 Moreover, even if the errors did have a non-zero mean, they would not necessarily be
suboptimal, because biased forecasts are optimal under asymmetric loss.  See Leitch and Tanner
(1991) and Christoffersen and Diebold (1997).
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the corresponding forecast errors.  The forecasts move with the actual growth rates but are
smoother, which is a well-known property of optimal forecasts of stationary series.
7  Moreover,
the forecast errors appear to have zero mean and display no obvious predictable patterns.
8  The
sharp cutoff in the sample autocorrelation function of the forecast errors beyond displacement
one, as shown in Figure 2, indicates first-order moving average structure, which is consistent
with optimality of the two-step-ahead forecasts.  The mean Livingston (annualized) real GDP
growth rate forecast in Table 1 is 2.54 percent, which closely accords with historical growth
realizations.
Ultimately, however, the issue of whether the Livingston forecasts are fully optimal is of
limited relevance for our purposes.  They simply are what they are, and we take them at face
value, asking whether and how they are linked to expected excess equity returns.  The first step
of that inquiry involves characterizing the links between the Livingston expectations and the
standard financial excess return predictors, to which we now turn.
3.  Expected Business Conditions and Financial Predictors of Excess Returns
In their classic assessment of the predictability of excess stock returns, Fama and French
(1989) find that excess returns are indeed predictable, with most predictive power coming from
the dividend yield, the default premium, and the term premium.  More precisely, they estimate
regressions of the form
, (1) 9 That is, the dividend yield,  , is equal to the difference between the required rate of
return and the growth rate of dividends,  .  Hence an increase in   will reduce  , other
things equal.
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and they document a strong relationship in terms of the usual t-statistics,   values, and so forth,
where   is the excess return on a broad stock portfolio over   periods, for   ranging from
one quarter to several years.
The key open question is why financial variables should predict excess returns.  Fama
and French (1989) suggest that the predictive power may derive from correlation with expected
business (macroeconomic) conditions.  Notoriously little direct evidence exists, however, as to
whether the financial variables actually are linked to expected business conditions.  In this
section we provide precisely such direct evidence, examining the extent to which the Livingston
real growth expectations are linked to the standard financial predictors, both pairwise and jointly. 
We estimate regressions of Livingston expected business conditions   on the dividend
yield  , the default premium  , and the term premium  .  In Table 2 we show
results from both simple and multiple regressions.
First consider the simple regressions, which reveal some links between the financial
variables and expected business conditions, although the strength and statistical significance
vary across variables and specifications.  First, the dividend yield is negatively related to
expected business conditions.  This accords with the dividend discount model, which predicts
that the dividend yield should fall when necessary to offset higher expected growth in
dividends.
9  Second, the term premium is positively related to expected business conditions. 
This accords with the basic notion that the yield curve slope is a leading indicator, with inverted-6-
yield curves indicating a likely future recession, due for example to tightening of monetary
policy, which increases short rates.  Finally, the default premium appears positively associated
with expected business conditions.  This seemingly anomalous result may be due to the short
horizons associated with the Livingston forecasts; that is, notwithstanding the positive
correlation between default premia and expected business conditions at short horizons, default
premia may be negatively correlated with expected business conditions at longer horizons of,
say, two or three years.
Now consider the multiple regressions, which provide a summary distillation of the links
between expected real business conditions and the financial variables, taken jointly as a set.  The
results show that expected business conditions are indeed systematically linked to the financial
variables, with  s of nearly thirty percent.  This is particularly noteworthy given the short
horizons of the Livingston expectations, because the dividend yield and term premium variables
– in addition to the default premium as already discussed – are often thought to have maximal
predictive value at much longer horizons.
In summary, the results of this section help us to understand why the standard financial
variables “work” in predictive regressions for excess stock returns:  they are correlated with
expected business conditions, as conjectured by Fama and French (1989).  Crucially, however,
the correlation is far from perfect ( ).  That is, the financial variables, even when taken
jointly as a set, provide only highly noisy proxies of expected business conditions.  This suggests
that, to the extent that expected excess returns are driven by expected business conditions,
superior return predictions may be produced via a direct measure of expected business
conditions.  We now provide precisely such a direct assessment of the effects of expected-7-
business conditions on expected excess stock returns.
4.  Expected Business Conditions and Expected Excess Returns
We now consider the central question of whether and how expected business conditions
are linked to expected excess returns.  We extend the approach of Fama and French (1989) to
include the Livingston expected business conditions as a predictor, estimating regressions of the
form
, (2) 
where the timing of the excess return   matches that of expected business conditions
, and where we standardize all predictors to facilitate comparison of coefficient
magnitudes.  
Note that the predictive regression (2) involves a two-step-ahead forecast rather than the
one-step-ahead forecast commonly employed in the literature.  We focus on two-step-ahead
forecasts for two reasons.  First, there is some uncertainty as to the precise time when the growth
forecasts are made, because they are constructed from surveys, and some forecasts may in fact be
made after the end of June or December, resulting in an overlap in the information sets from
which   and   are derived.  Focusing on forecasts of   rather than   guards
against this possibility.  Second, and most importantly and obviously, pairing   with
 matches the timing of the excess return to the horizon of the growth forecast.
Basic Results
We show the results in Table 3.  First consider the simple regressions in the upper panel,
in which we include the various predictors one at a time, and consider in particular the results for
expected business conditions.  The point estimate indicates an economically important negative-8-
relationship between expected excess returns and expected business conditions, with a one
standard deviation decrease in   producing roughly a 0.2 standard deviation increase in
expected excess returns.  The relationship is highly statistically significant at any conventional
level, and the   is quite high (for the return-prediction literature) at 4.74 percent.
The simple regression results for the standard financial predictors,  ,  , and
, are comparatively lackluster.  The coefficient point estimates for the financial predictors
are all smaller than that for  ; indeed, those for  , and   are less than half that
of  .  Similarly, the significance levels for the conventional predictors are weaker than
that for  , and   and   are statistically insignificant at any conventional level. 
Finally, the   values for the conventional predictors are all smaller than that for  , and
those for   and   are negligible.
Now consider the multiple regression results reported in the lower panel of Table 3. 
Regression of excess returns on the three standard financial predictors yields an   of 6.28.  The
size, significance, and negative sign of the coefficient on growth expectations from the multiple
regression match that of the earlier-discussed simple regression.  The multiple regression also
makes clear that the key financial predictor, whether based on coefficient size or significance, is
dividend yield.  Crucially, however, introduction of growth expectations as a predictor reduces
both the dividend yield coefficient point estimate and its t-statistic by roughly one third, while
simultaneously raising the   by more than fifty percent.
All told, the results of our generalized Fama-French analysis clearly point to expected
business conditions as a key determinant of expected excess returns, and moreover, they support
our earlier argument that the standard financial predictors are largely proxies for expected10   is the residual from a regression of log consumption on log human wealth (labor
income) and log non-human wealth (assets). 
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business conditions:  Once expected business conditions are included, the contribution of the
standard financial predictors is sharply reduced, if not completely eliminated.
Including the Consumption/Wealth Ratio
In recent years  , the generalized (log) consumption-wealth ratio of Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001a, b), has received attention as a predictor of excess returns.
10    is partly
non-financial insofar as it is driven partly by consumption, and partly financial insofar as non-
human wealth depends partly on equity holdings.  Here we assess its marginal predictive content
relative to the standard financial predictors and expected business conditions.
First consider the correlation between expected business conditions and the
consumption/wealth ratio.  We showed in section 3 that expected business conditions are
correlated with the standard financial predictors, which emerge as (noisy) proxies for expected
business conditions.  The question immediately arises as to whether the consumption/wealth
ratio is just another noisy proxy for expected business conditions.
As reported in Table 2, the coefficients from simple regressions of   on   are
small and insignificant, and the associated  values are small.  In addition, multiple regressions
of   on   and the standard financial predictors produce insignificant 
coefficients.  Overall, then, both the simple and multiple regression analyses suggest that the
relationship between   and   is likely non-existent, and at any rate certainly much
weaker than the relationship between   and the standard financial predictors.  Hence,
although the financial predictors appear to proxy for expected business conditions, the11 This result corroborates Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b), who find that   has no
predictive power for non-financial macro variables such as aggregate labor income or
consumption.  
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consumption/wealth ratio appears to capture something else.
11
Now consider predictive regressions for excess returns, beginning with the simple
regression of   on   reported in Table 3.  Interestingly, the regression coefficient is
large, the significance level is high, and the   is high.  Indeed, the   regression produces
the largest absolute coefficient, the highest marginal significance level, and the highest   of
any simple predictive regression.  These results essentially confirm the findings of Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001b), using a different sample and semi-annual rather than quarterly returns.
The predictive multiple regressions reported in Table 3 reveal equally interesting
patterns.  First, including   in the standard regression on financial predictors reveals a strong
and significant role for   in predicting excess returns, increasing the   by more than thirty
percent.  Interestingly, inclusion of   along with the traditional financial predictors results in
a slightly smaller increase in predictive content than does inclusion of   (  vs.
). 
Second, inclusion of both   and expected business conditions in the standard
regression on financial predictors renders the financial predictors irrelevant, leaving just 
and  .  Interestingly, the consumption wealth ratio and expected business conditions
alone have more predictive content for excess returns than do all three financial predictors.  In
particular, the specification including only   and   has an   more than 50 percent
larger than the   from the specification including only the traditional financial predictors.  All
told, it seems clear that   and    play important and complementary roles in-11-
determining expected excess returns, whereas the financial predictors largely “work” because of
their links to   and/or  .
Finally, in discussing the results in Table 3 it is noteworthy that, even in the presence of
, expected business conditions continue to exhibit a strong and statistically significant effect
on future excess returns.  Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b, 2005) have previously shown that a
large array of excess return predictors are rendered impotent when jointly analyzed alongside the
consumption wealth ratio.  The results in Table 3 indicate that the predictive content of expected
business conditions is robust to and largely independent from the inclusion of the consumption
wealth ratio.  These findings suggest that the channel through which expected business
conditions affect expected returns is distinct from the channel through which the consumption
wealth ratio operates.
Long-Horizon Analysis
The results thus far provide clear evidence that expected business conditions help to
forecast excess returns at a six-month horizon.  Here we examine the value of expected business
conditions in forecasting excess returns at various longer horizons.  We measure the long-
horizon regression coefficients using Hodrick’s (1992) unified vector autoregression (VAR)
methodology, which produces predictive regression coefficients and other model diagnostics at
all horizons from a single underlying VAR.
In Table 4 we report long-horizon regression statistics for horizons ranging from six to
sixty months.  As before, we standardize each predictor, so that we can compare the imputed
long-horizon regression coefficients across predictors.  In the top and bottom panels of Table 4
we present long-horizon multiple regression statistics implied by the Hodrick VAR system,12 In Tables 6 and 7 we provide estimates of the “Hodrick VARs” and associated residual
covariance matrices from which we produce the results of Table 4. 
13 We thank Sydney Ludvigson for encouraging us to perform the analysis reported in
this sub-section.
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excluding and including expected business conditions, respectively.  Each panel contains
multiple regression coefficients for each forecasting horizon and the implied  .
12
The patterns in the multiple regression coefficients indicate that the effect of including
expected business conditions dissipates as the forecasting horizon lengthens.  This is most
evident when looking at the dividend yield coefficient.  Inclusion of expected business
conditions reduces the dividend yield coefficient by 33 percent at the six month horizon, whereas
it reduces it by only five percent at the sixty month horizon.  A similar pattern arises for the
long-horizon  s.  At the six month horizon, adding expected business conditions to the set of
predictors increases the   by roughly 32 percent.  At horizons beyond eighteen months,
including expected business conditions results in no appreciable increase in return predictability.
The general pattern in coefficients and predictability at horizons beyond six months
indicates that expected business conditions are most useful for predicting excess returns over the
six to eighteen month horizon.  This finding is appealing.  It is consistent with both the short to
medium term nature of the Livingston forecasts, and with the possibility that other predictors
contain information, not contained in the Livingston forecasts, of relevance for forecasting
longer-term excess returns.  Quite naturally, then, the information content of the Livingston
forecasts appears most relevant over the horizons to which they are tailored.
Expected Business Conditions and Stock Market Volatility
13
We have shown that expected business conditions forecast excess stock returns at short-13-
and medium horizons.  Here we examine a possible reason why expected business conditions
forecast stock returns:  expected business conditions may forecast future volatility and hence
may be linked to perceived systematic risk and expected excess returns.
The claim that business conditions are linked to stock market volatility is certainly not
new.  In particular, as persuasively documented in an extensive study by Schwert (1989) and
echoed in subsequent work by Hamilton and Lin (1996) using very different and complementary
methods, stock market risk increases in recessions.  Indeed, it is fair to say that business
conditions are the only important and robust covariate of stock market volatility identified thus
far, notwithstanding the many investigations.
In Table 5 we examine the link between expected business conditions and realized stock
market volatility.  We use two data sources to compute realized semi-annual stock return
volatility.  The first is the daily CRSP value-weighted index, which is available since 1963,
resulting in a sample from 1963:1 through 2003:2.  The second is the daily S&P 500 index,
which is available since 1951, resulting in a sample from 1951:2 through 2003:2.  Then we
regress realized volatility,  , on expected business conditions,  , and the other
predictors considered earlier.
Consider first the regression results for CRSP-based realized volatility in the top panel. 
The univariate results indicate that expected business conditions, the dividend yield, and CAY
have highly statistically significant predictive ability for future volatility.  The estimated
relationship between expected business conditions and future volatility, in particular, agrees with
the findings of previous research:  low growth expectations forecast high stock return volatility. 
Moreover, when the predictors are considered jointly in a multiple regression, expected business-14-
conditions emerge as the most highly significant predictor of volatility, with a t-statistic in
excess of 4.0.  As in the univariate case, low growth expectations presage high future volatility.
Now consider the results for S&P-based realized volatility in the bottom panel of Table
5.  The signs of the univariate coefficient estimates match those of the CRSP-based estimates in
the top panel, although the magnitudes of the univariate estimates are generally smaller for the
longer S&P-based sample.  The multiple regression results, however, are considerably more
uniform across the two samples.  In particular, the estimated coefficient for expected business
conditions changes only slightly from -0.42 in the top CRSP-based panel to -0.36 in the bottom
S&P-based panel, and in each case t-statistic exceeds 3.0.  The estimated coefficients for the
remaining predictors are also very similar in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance
across the top and bottom panels, indicating that the relationship between stock return volatility
and the predictors is robust to changes in the sample period and the index used to construct the
volatility measure.
5.  Concluding Remarks
We found two key excess return predictors, Livingston business conditions expectations
and Lettau-Ludvigson generalized consumption/wealth.  Presumably, however, the time-
variation in expected excess returns is ultimately driven by time-varying expected risk and/or
time-varying risk aversion.  Hence the question naturally arises as to whether and how our
predictors are linked to equity market risk and risk aversion.
We believe that the Livingston business conditions expectations likely capture time-
varying risk, as we discussed earlier in detail.  But what of the Lettau-Ludvigson generalized
consumption/wealth ratio,  ?  We believe that   likely captures time-varying risk14 See for example Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Wu (2005) and the references
therein.
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aversion, via the following logical chain:
(1)  Theoretically, time-variation in expected excess returns is ultimately driven by time-
varying expected risk, time-varying risk aversion, or both;
(2)  Empirically, time-variation in expected excess returns is driven by two key
predictors, expected business conditions and  ;
(3)  Expected business conditions are linked to risk;
(4)  Expected business conditions and   are largely unrelated;
(5)  Hence, by elimination,   must be linked to risk aversion.
Our assertion that   captures time-varying risk aversion matches that of Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001b) and provides a largely independent confirmation of their work, insofar as we
arrive at the insight via a very different route.  Note, however, that we do not assert that
movements in   are exclusively driven by movements in risk aversion.  In particular, our
volatility forecasting results indicate that movements in   are also related to movements in
risk.  Accordingly, we suggest that   measures both risk aversion and a risk component
unrelated to the risk component forecasted by the Livingston expectations. 
Both our results and our interpretation are very much in agreement with the emerging
empirical consensus that expected excess returns are counter-cyclical – not only for stocks, as in
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001b), but also for bonds, as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
14 
Interestingly, part of the literature emphasizes higher risk in recessions, as in Constantinides and
Duffie (1996), and another part emphasizes higher risk aversion in recessions, as in Campbell-16-
and Cochrane (1999).  Our results unify those two literatures, suggesting that the cyclicality of
both risk and risk aversion contributes to the counter-cyclicality of expected excess returns: 
growth expectations are procyclical and have a robust negative impact on expected excess
returns, and CAY is countercyclical and simultaneously has a robust positive impact.References
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Summary Statistics for Excess Stock Returns,
Livingston Business Conditions Expectations, and Financial Predictors
Mean 6.35 2.54 3.32 0.96 0.79
Median 9.35 2.54 3.32 0.80 0.80
Std. Deviation 22.30 1.51 1.11 0.44 1.03
Skewness -0.35 -0.64 -0.06 1.27 0.02
Kurtosis 3.40 4.97 2.57 4.26 3.08
Notes:  In the first column, we report summary statistics for excess returns ( ) on the value-weighted
CRSP index relative to 90-day U.S. Treasuries.  In the second column, we report summary statistics for
the median two-step-ahead semi-annual growth rate forecasts from the Livingston Survey of Professional
Forecasters ( ).  In the remaining columns, we report summary statistics for the dividend yield
( ), default premium ( ), and the term premium ( ).  The sample period is t = 1952:1-
2003:2, for a sample size of  semi-annual observations.  We report all variables as annualized
percentages.Table 2
Regressions of Business Conditions Expectations on Excess Stock Return Predictors
Simple Regressions
-0.28
(0.26)
-- -- -- 4.2%
-- 0.40
(0.13)
-- -- 16.2%
-- -- 0.20
(0.09)
-- 4.1%
-- -- -- -0.10
(0.10)
0.9%
Multiple Regressions
-0.36
(0.19)
0.50
(0.14)
0.06
(0.09)
-- 29.04%
-0.34
(0.21)
0.50
(0.14)
0.09
(0.11)
-0.06
(0.13)
29.32%
Notes:  We report OLS estimates of regressions of real GDP growth expectations ( ) on several
predictors, 1952:1-2003:2, with Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.   ,  , 
are as defined earlier, and   is the Lettau-Ludvigson (2001a, b) generalized consumption-wealth
ratio.  We standardize all predictors.  See text for details.Table 3
Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on
Business Conditions Expectations and Various Additional Predictors
                                                                                                                                                  
Simple Regressions
-0.22
(0.08)
-- -- -- -- 4.74%
-- 0.19
(0.10)
-- -- -- 3.62%
-- -- -0.02
(0.08)
-- -- 0.00%
-- -- -- 0.10
(0.08)
-- 0.95%
-- -- -- -- 0.24
(0.07)
5.89%
Multiple Regressions
-- 0.25
(0.10)
-0.11
(0.07)
0.15
(0.07)
-- 6.28%
-0.21
(0.09)
0.17
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.09)
0.17
(0.07)
-- 9.41%
-- 0.18
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.07)
-0.09
(0.09)
0.17
(0.10)
8.56%
-0.20
(0.10)
0.12
(0.10)
0.00
(0.09)
0.11
(0.09)
0.16
(0.10)
11.35%
-0.20
(0.08)
-- -- -- 0.22
(0.08)
9.70%
Notes:  We report OLS estimates of regressions of excess returns ( ) on various predictors, 1952:1-
2003:2, with Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.  We standardize all predictors.  See text
for details.Table 4
Long-Horizon Regressions of Excess Stock Returns on
Business Conditions Expectations and Various Additional Predictors
Forecasting Horizon (Months)
Multiple Regression Long-Horizon Betas, Excluding 
0.180 0.346 0.501 0.646 0.783 0.911 1.030 1.140 1.250 1.350
0.100 0.182 0.251 0.312 0.367 0.417 0.463 0.507 0.547 0.584
0.090 0.148 0.186 0.211 0.228 0.240 0.249 0.257 0.264 0.270
0.170 0.298 0.390 0.453 0.495 0.519 0.530 0.533 0.529 0.520
 (%) 7.52 11.10 12.80 13.40 13.60 13.40 13.20 12.90 12.60 12.30
Multiple Regression Long-Horizon Betas, Including 
0.190 0.302 0.361 0.388 0.393 0.386 0.371 0.353 0.333 0.313
0.120 0.259 0.406 0.553 0.697 0.834 0.961 1.08 1.19 1.29
0.000 0.046 0.117 0.200 0.284 0.364 0.438 0.503 0.561 0.611
0.110 0.183 0.236 0.276 0.308 0.334 0.355 0.372 0.385 0.394
0.160 0.268 0.340 0.386 0.416 0.434 0.444 0.450 0.452 0.452
 (%) 9.90 13.00 13.80 13.70 13.40 12.90 12.40 12.00 11.60 11.20
Notes:  We report long-horizon regression coefficients and   values for horizons ranging from six to
sixty months,  1952:1-2003:2.  In the top panel we report multiple regression coefficients and   values
for a specification that excludes expected business conditions as a predictor.  In the bottom panel we
report coefficients and   values for a specification that includes expected business conditions as a
predictor.  We standardize all predictors.  See text for details.Table 5
Hodrick VAR Estimates
 (%)
VAR(1) Excluding 
0.00 0.00 0.18
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.07)
0.09
(0.09)
0.17
(0.10)
8.56
-- -- -- -- -- -- –
0.00 0.00 0.94
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.06
(0.04)
-0.06
(0.03)
88.66
0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.05)
0.88
(0.05)
-0.21
(0.08)
0.01
(0.04)
77.44
0.00 0.00 -0.13
(0.11)
0.15
(0.08)
0.57
(0.09)
0.19
(0.08)
48.06
0.00 0.00 0.05
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.07)
0.72
(0.09)
52.75
VAR(1) Including 
0.00 -0.19
(0.10)
0.12
(0.10)
0.00
(0.08)
0.11
(0.08)
0.16
(0.09)
11.35
0.00 0.61
(0.06)
-0.16
(0.08)
0.29
(0.07)
-0.12
(0.05)
0.10
(0.06)
59.41
0.00 0.06
(0.04)
0.96
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.03)
88.92
0.00 -0.04
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.05)
0.91
(0.06)
-0.21
(0.08)
0.01
(0.04)
77.61
0.00 -0.07
(0.07)
-0.15
(0.10)
0.18
(0.09)
0.58
(0.09)
0.18
(0.08)
48.42
0.00 0.03
(0.07)
0.06
(0.09)
-0.03
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.07)
0.71
(0.09)
52.83
Notes:  We report coefficient estimates and   values for the Hodrick VAR systems that underlie Table
4, with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.  We exclude expected business conditions from the
VAR in the top panel, and we include them in the bottom panel.  We standardize all predictors.  See text
for details.Table 6
Covariance Matrices of Residuals from Hodrick VARs
VAR(1) Excluding 
0.92 – 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.18
-- -- -- -- -- –
– – 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.10
-- -- – 0.22 0.10 0.07
-- -- -- – 0.50 0.07
-- -- -- -- -- --
VAR(1) Including 
0.89 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.19
– 0.41 -0.08 0.01 0.09 -0.08
-- – 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.10
-- -- – 0.22 0.10 0.07
-- -- -- – 0.50 0.07
-- -- -- -- -- 0.47
Notes:  We report covariance matrices for the Hodrick VAR systems that underlie Table 4.  We
exclude expected business conditions from the VAR in the top panel, and we include it in the
bottom panel.  We standardize all variables.  See text for details.Table 7
Regressions of Realized Stock Return Volatility on
Business Conditions Expectations and Various Additional Predictors
CRSP Value-Weighted Realized Volatility: 1963:1 - 2003:2
-0.23
(0.09)
-- -- -- -- 5.48%
-- -0.32
(0.16)
-- -- -- 10.18%
-- -- 0.11
(0.13)
-- -- 1.15%
-- -- -- -0.13
(0.14)
-- 1.55%
-- -- -- --- -0.38
(0.13)
14.78%
-0.42
(0.10)
-0.50
(0.15)
0.58
(0.15)
-0.10
(0.11)
-0.32
(0.10)
45.44%
S&P 500 Realized Volatility: 1951:2 - 2003:2
-0.04
(0.10)
-- -- -- -- 0.15%
-- -0.32
(0.13)
-- -- -- 9.87%
-- -- 0.20
(0.12)
-- -- 4.22%
-- -- -- -0.04
(0.13)
-- 0.19%
-- -- -- -- -0.28
(0.11)
8.12%
-0.36
(0.11)
-0.50
(0.09)
0.51
(0.13)
-0.06
(0.10)
-0.19
(0.08)
33.09%
Notes:  We report OLS estimates of regressions of realized stock return volatility,  , on various
predictors, 1952:1-2003:2, with Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses.  We standardize all
predictors.  See text for details.-.10
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Figure 1
Real GDP Growth, Livingston Forecast, and Livingston Forecast Error
Notes:  On the right scale we show U.S. semi-annual real GDP and the corresponding Livingston
forecast.  On the left scale we show the their difference, the forecast error.  See text for details.-.4
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Figure 2
Sample Autocorrelation Function
Two-Step Ahead Real GDP Growth Forecast Errors
Notes:  We report the sample autocorrelation function of two-step-ahead Livingston real GDP
growth forecast errors, 1952:1-2003:2, along with approximate ninety-five percent confidence
intervals under the null hypothesis of white noise.  The forecasts are made semi-annually, so the
autocorrelation displacement is measured in units of six months.  Hence, for example, a
displacement of two corresponds to one year.  The Ljung-Box statistic for testing the hypothesis
of zero autocorrelations at displacements 2 through 25 is 18.76, which is insignificant at any
conventional level.  See text for details.CFS Working Paper Series: 
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